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Synopsis 
This paper utilises the theoretical work of Bruno Latour to explore whether and in what 
ways the law and legal processes work to stabilise addiction as a health problem or 
‘disease’. In undertaking this analysis we also explore the associated gender implications 
of these practices and the means through which legal processes that stabilise addiction 
simultaneously stabilise gender. We explore these issues through an analysis of interview 
data from Australia and Canada, where lawyers talk about the ways they understand 
addiction and how it features in their work. We argue that legal practices are centrally 
implicated in the making of both gender and health and that elements of these processes, 




This paper explores the question of whether and in what ways the law and legal 
processes work to stabilise addiction as a health problem or ‘disease’. In undertaking this 
analysis we also explore the associated gender implications of these practices and the 
means through which legal processes that stabilise addiction simultaneously stabilise 
gender. Using the work of science and technologies scholar Bruno Latour, in particular 
his anthropological analysis of scientific and legal ‘modes of existence’, we explore legal 
processes of what he calls ‘veridiction’ – or the specific processes by which law 
distinguishes truth from falsity – associated with addiction. We focus on processes that 
are largely hidden from public view and as such receive little scrutiny, but through which 
the meaning of addiction as a disease is secured. Our aim is to consider the role of legal 
negotiations in establishing agreed facts, and to explore lawyers’ understanding of these 
processes. We argue that although in public discourse judges are ascribed the status of 
the law’s key decision-making figures, lawyers’ accounts do not necessarily support this 
view. Instead, their accounts of the judicial process foreground their own and other 
lawyers’ role in decisions about addiction, despite an absence of training or education in 
the area. We also note that lawyers’ accounts suggest little independent oversight – even 
from judges – of the work lawyers do in stabilising addiction ‘facts’. Based on these 
observations we consider the ways such processes of stabilisation impact on women in 
the legal system whose lives are in some way affected by discourses of addiction as a 
disease. We argue that legal practices of veridiction are centrally implicated in the making 
of both gender and health and that elements of these processes, which are not often 





Addiction is a relatively recently developed concept1 that first emerged in relation to the 
consumption of alcohol and has since expanded into a range of different areas of human 
life. As scholars have noted, in recent decades an increasing number of activities (such as 
sex, Internet use, gambling, eating, exercise and shopping) have come to be recast 
through the language of addiction, reframed as compulsive forms of conduct. Famously, 
Eve Sedgwick described this as a process of escalating ‘addiction-attribution’2, and in 
their 2014 book, Fraser, Moore and Keane recast this notion, arguing that the ‘addicting’3 
of contemporary society is underway. While the language of addiction is increasingly 
deployed in a range of settings, its meaning is not well defined.4 Little consensus exists 
among scientists and clinicians,5 as well as policymakers and alcohol and other drug 
(AOD) health service providers,6 on key concepts underpinning it. Disagreements 
include whether addiction is a disease, whether ‘addicts’ are responsible for and can 
control their own behaviour, and whether they should be held to account for compulsive 
conduct and associated behaviours. Probably the most widespread approach at present is 
one that itself has several manifestations: the ‘disease model’ first advanced in the late 
18th and early 19th centuries.7 Scientific versions of the disease model generally ‘share the 
common view that control over drug use is somehow impaired’, although they differ as 
to the precise mechanisms involved.8 In recent years, for example, the (neuroscientific) 
brain disease model has gained influence. This is largely a result of the work of the US 
National Institute on Drug Abuse, which first articulated this view under the leadership 
of Alan Leshner, and has since invested heavily in it under the direction of Nora 
                                                        
1 Room (2003): Levine (1978). 
2 Sedgwick (1993). 
3 Fraser, Moore and Keane (2014). 
4 Fraser (2015). 
5 Carter, Mathews, Bell, Lucke and Hall (2014).  
6 Karasaki, Fraser, Moore and Dietze (2013). 
7 Carter, Mathews, Bell, Lucke and Hall (2014). 
8 Carter, Mathews, Bell, Lucke and Hall (2014 at 206). 
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Volkow.9 In that they are thought to relieve those who use drugs from responsibility and 
blame for their condition,10 disease models of addiction are often thought to be more 
generous and progressive than traditional conceptualisations of drug use (where drug use 
was understood as a form of deviance, wickedness or moral failing). This approach has 
also attracted vigorous criticism, however. Some have pointed to the failure of the 
neuroscience of addiction to live up to its potential,11 others have argued that the 
possibility of moral judgment, stigmatisation and marginalisation of those who use drugs 
or those who are labelled as ‘addicts’ persists.12 This might occur where, for example, the 
addicted individual is conceptualised as perpetually sick, unable to make sensible 
decisions and in need of treatment. Where disease models are underpinned by the 
assumption that addicts lack volition or the capacity for self-control, the use of coercive 
practices and paternalistic policies – including involuntary treatment, detention and 
sterilisation – can follow.13 As we have argued in our previous work,14 these processes 
and conceptualisations can have far-reaching implications for people who use drugs and 
those labelled addicts, constituting them as flawed subjects, or as non-citizens.   
 
These debates about the meaning and regulatory function of addiction concepts 
have also given rise to a growing body of scholarship on concepts of addiction in policy 
and service provision,15 but research on legal settings is far less common. This is 
important because ideas about the nature and meaning of addiction regularly impact on 
legal settings, with major implications for the rights of people who use drugs, and those 
                                                        
9 Leshner (1997).   
10 Fox (1999). 
11 Hall, Carter and Forlini (2015).  
12 Reinarman (2011); Courtwright (2010); Brook and Stringer (2005). 
13 Lucke and Hall (2014).  
14 Seear and Fraser (2010) 
15 Moore, Fraser, Törrönen and Eriksson (2015). 
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labelled addicts. As we have argued elsewhere,16 courts are increasingly being called upon 
to consider key questions about addiction, such as whether and how addiction is relevant 
to sentencing in the context of the criminal law. Although a number of studies focus on 
how specialist drug courts operate, as well as how they approach drug use,17 addiction is 
rarely the central object of analysis in such research. Indeed, beyond a few examples, 
including our own recent work,18 few critical analyses have been conducted on the 
models of addiction operating in the law, and the many implications of these approaches 
for people caught up in legal processes, whether as plaintiffs, defendants or others. To 
our knowledge, no research has yet investigated lawyers’ perceptions of these processes, 
nor their role in negotiations around the ‘nature’ and meaning of addiction. As we will go 
on to explain, lawyers report playing a significant role in these processes – a 
phenomenon we argue deserves more attention.   
 
In conducting our analysis we focus on an area to date largely ignored in the 
literature: the gender dimensions of addiction in the law. Using the work of science and 
technologies scholar Bruno Latour,19 in particular his anthropological analysis of 
scientific and legal ‘modes of existence’, we explore legal processes of ‘veridiction’ – or 
the specific processes by which law distinguishes truth from falsity – associated with 
addiction and gender.20 To this end, we examine lawyers’ understandings of the role of 
                                                        
16 Seear and Fraser (2014a). 
17 Fitzgerald (2008); Murphy (2011); Murphy (2012); Tiger (2011); Vrecko (2009). 
18 Seear (2015); Seear and Fraser (2014b). 
19 In this sense, our paper is part of an emerging body of scholarship that draws upon elements of Latour's 
work and applies it to different legal and regulatory settings or questions. Kyle McGee's recent work 
represents a notable example, as does the work of Jay Sanderson (2013), among others.  
20 We acknowledge that Latour is not the first theorist to critically examine the way that particular legal 
processes and practices make truths, and the implications thereof. In Feminism and the power of law, for 
example, Carol Smart (1989 at 4) explored ‘law’s ability to impose its definition of events on everyday life’ 
and – speaking specifically about gender and truth making – argued that ‘law manages to retain the ability 
to arrogate to itself the right to define the truth of things in spite of the growing challenge of other 
discourses like feminism’. Latour’s work differs from Smart’s in important ways, however. Whereas Smart 
arguably frames events and everyday life as objective realities that to some extent exist prior to legal 
discourse, practices and processes, Latour would argue that what counts as events and everyday life is 
constituted through the law. 
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legal processes in the production of addiction as a disease, the related stabilisation of 
‘addicts’ as lacking volition, and the place of gender in these processes. Our analysis is 
based on data collected for a pilot project studying legal practice and addiction. Although 
we focus on the accounts of a small number of interviewees here, the themes we present 
(relating to legal processes of veridiction and gender) were found to be present 
throughout the pilot data. We focus on select accounts as a way of illuminating in-depth, 
how different lawyers encounter addiction in their work and understand truth-making 
practices to unfold. Building on previous work on the limits of disease models of 
addiction, and on the impressions articulated by our participants, we argue that, when 
brought to bear on issues of addiction, legal processes of veridiction may operate to 
marginalise and oppress women – particularly when they experience family violence at 
the hands of men. These processes, rarely subjected to public scrutiny, require more 
critical analysis, particularly by feminist scholars, socio-legal scholars and scholars of 
health law. 
 
Approach: Law as a mode of existence 
Our analysis is inspired by Bruno Latour’s recent book, An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence 
(hereafter AIME).21 This book synthesises several decades of scholarship to consider 
what he terms modernist ‘modes of thought’ across various ‘domains’ including law, 
science, politics, religion and economics. Drawing on Latour’s key observation that the 
law is a ‘highly distinctive world’,22 with its own processes of veridiction – or truth 
making – we argue that the law has particular ways of establishing truth, allowing non-
expert deliberations that frequently rely upon commonsense assumptions, for example 
about gender. The nature of these processes of veridiction also means that such 
                                                        
21 Latour (2013). 
22 Latour (2013 at 54). 
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deliberations remain largely immune to scrutiny. Latour’s book is in many respects the 
culmination of a life’s work. Bringing together ethnographic research on science, law and 
other domains of knowledge and practice including politics and economics, AIME is 
concerned with exploring ‘modern’ – developed late capitalist – societies, how their 
institutions understand and make sense of the world, and the claims they make in the 
process of producing knowledge about fundamental phenomena such as nature, culture 
and truth. AIME builds upon and extends Latour’s earlier works, including his first 
major foray into the study of law: The Making of Law,23 a detailed ethnography of a 
French administrative court. This anthropological project leads him to conceptualise 
these institutions as each positing and working from a particular ‘mode’ of existence with 
an ‘exclusive manner of demanding truth’.24 The law, for example, is a ‘highly distinctive25 
structure that mobilises ‘its own [system of] explanation’.26 In this sense: 
 
law has its own separate place; it is recognized as a domain that can be isolated 
from the rest; it has its own force, as everyone would agree; and above all […] it 
has its own mode of veridiction, certainly different from that of science, but 
universally acknowledged as capable of distinguishing truth from falsity in its own 
way.27  
 
According to Latour, the law is the only mode of existence ‘to have offered […] 
resistance to the demand for explicitness’,28 in that it is dominated by a simultaneously 
‘obscure’ and ‘respectable’ method of establishing truth and falsity that is distinct from 
other modes of veridiction.  
                                                        
23 Latour (2009).  
24 Latour (2013 at 366). 
25 Latour (2013 at 54). 
26 Latour (2013 at 359). 
27 Latour (2013 at 358-9). 
28 Latour (2013 at 359-60). 
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In The Making of Law, Latour argues that one of the key characteristics of legal 
processes of veridiction involves the setting of parameters for the issues to be resolved. 
He explains that judges have specific, defined tasks, and these separate them from other 
knowledge-makers, notably scientists. Judges, he says, have to: 
 
answer each of the arguments invoked […] and only those arguments (imagine 
how horrified a scientist would be if she were asked to address only those 
questions asked of her by others rather than the hundreds she has asked of 
herself), to add as few innovations as possible to the knowledge established by 
their predecessors […] and to do all of this in such a way as to close the 
discussion once and for all.29  
 
In this way, legal processes of veridiction are fundamentally distinct from those of 
science. Law is intended to be an internally coherent total system of logic through which 
lawyers ‘can indulge a power to invent fictions’ or to introduce ‘constructive solutions’, 
precisely because – unlike science – ‘they have no object, or no objectity,30 to deal with’.31 
These processes play out differently between different courts, tribunals and jurisdictions 
(there are, for example, differences, between how lawyers operate in the French 
administrative tribunal that was Latour’s focus in The Making of Law and how they 
operate in the jurisdictions we analyse for this article). Nevertheless, there are important 
connections too. In many areas of law, legal professionals are not simply empowered to 
                                                        
29 Latour (2009 at 205). 
30 According to Latour, ‘we should distinguish ‘objectivity’ as the basis of a mood of indifference and 
serenity as to the solution, from what might be termed ‘objectity’: the ordeal by means of which a scientist 
binds her own fate and that of her speech to the trials undergone by the phenomenon in the course of an 
experiment. Whereas objectivity, paradoxically, pertains to the subject and his interior state, objectity pertains 
to the object and its peculiarly judicial role’. (Latour 2013 at 236).  
31 Latour (2009 at 240).  
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engage in processes designed to result in constructive solutions, but required to do so.  
In recent years, for example, courts all over the world have begun to implement 
processes of ‘managerial judging’, whereby ‘judges or judicial officers […] control the 
movement of cases through a court […] managing the time and events involved’.32 One 
of the main initiatives of managerial judging is that of ‘case management’, where the aim 
is to: 
 
encourage the parties to identify and reach agreement on as many issues as 
possible that are not in dispute and thus reduce the length of a trial or obviate it 
altogether.33 
 
In most instances, this happens via multiple formal meetings (such as mediations) 
between the parties, where the court has ordered them to try and narrow or resolve the 
issues in dispute.34 In other instances, these processes happen less formally, as courts 
invite or encourage parties to reach agreement on key facts and points of law to narrow 
down the issues in dispute.  
 
This difference between two of modern societies’ most influential systems of 
veridiction raises important questions about what happens when they come into contact, 
as they do more and more frequently where scientific evidence is used in deciding cases. 
Because of the law’s distinctive approach to veridiction, 
  
                                                        
32 King, Freiberg, Batagol and Hyams (2014 at 218). 
33 King, Freiberg, Batagol and Hyams (2014 at 218). 
34 For more on case management, see Australian Centre for Justice Innovation (2013) The Timeliness 
Project http://www.aija.org.au/Timeliness%20Forum/Timeliness%20Report%20ACJI.pdf (accessed 22nd  
August 2015).  
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When an expert gives evidence in court, the judge and the law take all 
precautions to ensure that what the expert says should be neither a judgment nor 
a warrant for judgment, but that it should serve only as a form of testimony 
which does not usurp the role of the judge.35 
 
In other words, the law entails a process of taking into account but not necessarily 
deferring to scientific knowledge, nor to claims of scientific objectivity and truth. Legal 
officials retain the power to determine for themselves the meaning of specific scientific 
findings or assertions, and to incorporate those interpretations into a distinctly legal 
framework for distinguishing truth from falsity.  
 
As Latour points out, legal conceptualisations of ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ often make 
little sense to people other than legal experts. Importantly, legal conceptualisations of 
what is (and is not) legally possible often depend upon whether there is a legal means for a 
particular course of legal action. The existence of a legal ‘means’ depends upon a 
combination of obscure and highly specific factors including the existence of legislation, 
regulations and other legal procedures, rules of evidence and case law, details of how 
these have or are likely to be interpreted, and so on. These are factors generally 
understood only by lawyers. In what follows, we mobilise Latour’s insights to consider 
lawyers’ impressions of the contact between science and the law in the specific case of 
addiction. In particular we examine how lawyers perceive these processes, including their 
perceptions of the effects of the encounter between medico-psychiatric modes of 
conceptualising addiction and the legal processes of veridiction noted above. Drawing on 
interview data collected from lawyers whose work involves issues of drug use and 
addiction, we explore how, in their view, debates about the ‘nature’ of addiction play out 
                                                        
35 Latour (2009 at 206).   
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in court settings, focusing on what has to get resolved, how boundaries are drawn and 
what arguments are invoked. As we shall explain, lawyers’ descriptions of these processes 
suggest that legal practices may often reinforce and compound existing inequities for 




Our analysis is based on data collected in 2013-14 for a pilot project analysing concepts 
of addiction in Australian and Canadian law. The pilot had two main components. The 
first was a mapping exercise in which we identified legal realms in which addiction 
features. The second was an in-depth interview component, where we explored the 
concepts of addiction used by lawyers working in Australia and Canada. A total of 
fourteen interviews were conducted (n=7 in Australia; n=7 in Canada; with 10 women 
and 4 men). These lawyers worked across a range of different legal realms including 
family law, criminal law, family violence, administrative law and human rights law, with 
the majority employed by non-profit organisations.  
 
We chose to compare these jurisdictions for several reasons. The two share 
important similarities. Both Australia and Canada are Commonwealth jurisdictions, and 
both were early adopters of harm reduction, a key public health response to illicit drug 
use in the West.36 Both are regularly ranked highly in overall standard of living,37 but 
sustain major pockets of marginalisation and disadvantage in relation to AOD use.38 As 
well, Sydney and Vancouver both host supervised injecting facilities.39 There are also key 
differences. For example, unlike Australia, Canada has a Commonwealth Charter of 
                                                        
36 Ritter and Cameron (2006).  
37 Tiffen and Gittins (2004). 
38 Ritter, Lancaster, Grech and Reuter (2011).  
39 de Vel-Palumbo, Matthew-Simmons, Shanahan and Ritter (2013).   
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Rights and Freedoms.40 Although the supervised injecting facilities in both countries 
emerged out of long political campaigns, public scrutiny of the facilities has been handled 
differently. In Canada, lawyers played a vital role in resisting Federal government attempts 
to close down the facility through a constitutional challenge, based in part on provisions 
in the Charter. The facility was kept open only through the landmark legal case of Canada 
(Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society (known as the ‘Insite’ case) which in part 
turned on the idea that addiction was a ‘disease’.41 In Australia, proponents of supervised 
injecting facilities have not had to rely on such legal challenges. These similarities and 
differences offer important opportunities for learning and exchange between the two 
countries. Little research has been conducted to date exploring these similarities and 
differences and the opportunities they offer to the AOD field in general or to legal 
practitioners in particular (excepting Fraser, forthcoming42), yet the two nations have 
much to learn from each other. 
 
Interviews were confidential, digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim. All interviews 
were conducted by one of the authors (KS). To ensure anonymity we have assigned 
pseudonyms to all participants. The interviews explored a range of issues including: 
definitions of addiction; concepts or models of addiction drawn on in legal work; 
relevance of statutes and case law from within and outside the participants’ own fields of 
expertise; experiences of and needs regarding education in AOD and addiction; views on 
the strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches; and public policy implications of 
various legal approaches to addiction. Data were analysed using the Miles and Huberman 
                                                        
40 Although there are some state and territory based Charters in Australia, such as Victoria’s Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, these generally do not offer the same level of protections as the 
Canadian Charter. 
41 Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society [2011] 3 SCR 134. 
42 Fraser (Forthcoming).  
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approach43, which involves thematic analysis and coding in three stages: data reduction, 
data display and data analysis. Our analysis suggests that an important dynamic unfolds in 
the associations between legal processes of veridiction, addiction, health and gender, at 
least in terms of how lawyers perceive their own role and describe these processes. 
Insofar as this paper explores lawyers’ perceptions of these processes, and does not draw 
upon formal and direct observation of them, we argue that these dynamics deserve 
further scholarly attention. The project was approved by the Curtin University Human 
Ethics Research Committee (Approval number: HR146/2013).  
 
Stabilising the legal ‘fact’ of addiction as a disease  
The starting point for our analysis is the examination of how legal processes secure or 
stabilise particular notions of addiction. A key exemplar of how this happens is the 
landmark decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in Canada (Attorney General) v PHS 
Community Services Society (known as the ‘Insite’ case), which instantiated the idea that 
addiction is a ‘disease’.44 Insite was concerned with the legality of Vancouver’s supervised 
drug consumption facility (‘Insite’), a clinic designed to allow on-site consumption of 
illicit drugs such as heroin and crystal methamphetamine so as to support illicit drug 
consumers in avoiding blood-borne virus transmission, overdose and other dangers 
associated with illicit drug use.45 Established as a pilot facility in 2003, Insite operated at 
first through a special government exemption from the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. 
By 2007, however, the Federal Minister for Health had decided not to grant further 
exemptions beyond the middle of 2008. In effect, the operation of Insite would be illegal 
after that time. Clients and advocates of the facility issued proceedings, with the case 
eventually making its way to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court 
                                                        
43 Miles and Huberman (1994).  
44 Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society [2011] 3 SCR 134. 
45 See: http://supervisedinjection.vch.ca/ (accessed 12 February 2016).  
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concluded that drug addiction was an ‘illness’, and that although some addicts retain the 
‘power of choice’, addiction was ultimately ‘a disease in which the central feature is 
impaired control over the use of the addictive substance’.46 Based in part on this 
assessment, the Supreme Court concluded that the Federal Government’s intended 
closure of Insite limited the rights of ‘addicts’ under Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, which protects the right to life, liberty and security of the person. The 
Court found that in limiting access to health care services, the government’s intentions 
would have created a risk to the health and the lives of people who inject drugs, thereby 
depriving them of the protections afforded under Section 7. The facility therefore 
remained open.  
 
In Insite, the Court’s conceptualisation of addiction as disease was central to the 
final outcome. Although scientific evidence about the nature of addiction had been 
gathered for the case, and was for a time a live issue, these debates were resolved at a 
critical point of the trial not by scientific experts, nor even the judge, but by the opposing 
lawyers. As the trial judge, Judge Pitfield, explained: ‘The plaintiffs and Canada agree on 
one thing: drug addiction is an illness’.47 One of our Canadian participants, Erica, was an 
observer to these proceedings. Erica works across a range of different areas of law, 
although her work often focuses on disadvantaged and marginalised groups. Her 
perception of how this agreement was reached aligns with Latour’s observations on the 
way key figures in litigation set parameters about what issues are relevant and need to be 
resolved, and the ways courts deal only with arguments invoked before it. As Erica 
explained: 
 
                                                        
46 Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society [2011] 3 SCR 134. 
47 PHS Community Services Society v. Attorney General of Canada 2008 BCSC 661 at para 47. (available at: 
http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2008/2008bcsc661/2008bcsc661.html; accessed 22 August 
2015).  
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I was in court just watching one day and there was something going on in the 
courtroom that was kind of disturbing, which was that the judge in the course of 
submissions whenever he used the words ‘addiction is an illness’ he put like scare 
quotes around it.  
 
Interviewer: He actually did that – in gestures? 
 
Erica: Yes, he used the bunny ears and so on. You know: ‘if addiction is an 
“illness”’ etc, etc. And [the lawyer] rose and said ‘You know my Lord, I think 
everyone in the room is in agreement that addiction is an illness in the way that 
we are talking about it and my friend [the opposing lawyer] I hope will rise if I’m 
not right about this’. And so the lawyer for the Crown who is […] a very good 
lawyer in Vancouver and he is a stalwart lawyer, he’s very conservative but he is 
extremely professional, he was on as an ad hoc lawyer for the Crown, and he rose 
and he said ‘No my Lord, quite right. We all agree that addiction is an illness’. So 
[…the case was no longer] about that, and from then on everything changed. 
You know the tone of the room changed, the judge’s approach to what they were 
talking about changed. So when I say that that finding was key, it was key […] 
from the moment that the judge understood what they were after, which was, 
you know, people who have an illness, their compulsion is, you know, it’s not 
their own volition that they have to do this. It’s that they are – for a lack of better 
word – infected with something. You know, his understanding that that was at play 
was everything to that case.    
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Viewed from the perspective offered in Latour’s analysis, the process Erica describes 
forecloses debate about the meaning of addiction, resolving it legally as a disease.48 It 
seems lawyers played a key role in fixing this particular legal truth, in that their agreement 
alone meant no further argument was needed on the point. Once addiction was defined 
without contest as a disease, responses to it became subject to particular legal 
considerations, and from this point onwards the Court’s decision-making scope 
narrowed significantly. In Latour’s terms, the legal discussion distinguished ‘truth from 
falsity in its own way’ and debate was subsequently closed off, ‘once and for all’.    
 
Like Erica, other participants discussed legal processes by which addiction was, in 
their estimation, given particular, decisive, meanings in court decisions. Some of these 
occur in less formal ways in legal settings, or with slightly different emphases and 
implications. In the next section we explore this process, primarily through an analysis of 
the explanations given by one lawyer (Carl) about how debates about addiction play out 
even before lawyers enter the courtroom. We argue that Carl’s account raises important 
questions about legal understandings of addiction, in particular about the connections 
made between addiction, illness, agency, responsibility, violence and gender. We 
conclude by arguing that these processes are in need of further scholarly attention in that 
they appear to play out in gendered ways, with potentially inequitable effects, impacting 
most heavily on women.  
 
Addiction as a disease: gender implications 
Carl is a lawyer who works in a wide range of Australian legal realms, but regularly 
represents female victims of family violence who are seeking what in Australia are called 
intervention orders (also known as apprehended violence orders). Intervention orders 
                                                        
48 PHS Community Services Society v. Attorney General of Canada 2008 BCSC 661 at paragraphs 48-59. 
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differ depending on who is involved, but in essence they are civil orders made by a court 
where it is deemed necessary to protect someone from physical or psychological harm. 
These orders are usually sought after one person (the respondent) has assaulted or 
threatened to assault another person (the victim) or where there is a pattern of financial 
abuse, stalking, or other controlling behaviour. Where an intervention order is made, the 
court has considerable scope to determine its content. It might prevent the respondent 
from having any contact with the victim (a comprehensive order), or prohibit only 
certain kinds of contact, such as verbal contact and contact in financial matters (a limited 
order). Where an order involves a couple in a relationship, an order of the former kind 
might have the effect of ejecting the respondent from the family home and prohibiting 
all forms of contact. A limited order might permit the couple to continue living together, 
but on certain conditions. Breaching an intervention order is a criminal offence.  
 
In our interview Carl offered details on processes we have already described in 
this article, including those where courts enjoin or order parties to engage in a dialogue in 
a bid to narrow the issues in dispute or resolve them altogether. We might understand 
this, in Latour’s terms, as an example of lawyers participating in the process of 
formulating ‘constructive solutions’ with ontological effects. For Carl, addiction (or what 
is often referred to as ‘dependence’ in Australia) often plays an important role in these 
family violence proceedings, especially for lawyers acting for the respondent. As Carl 
explains: 
 
What we know about family violence is that it’s very gendered in its nature 
[…and] the research sort of supports the idea that it’s actually about a choice to 
use violence against partners. The push-back [from other lawyers] for that is 
often around saying: ‘Well you know the person has addictions, there are drug 
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and alcohol issues, they experienced family violence as a child, it’s inter-
generational sort of stuff’. So in that sort of context we often see addiction 
bandied around. 
 
Here, Carl is explaining that because violence has been defined in law as a choice, lawyers 
acting for respondents often seek ways of casting doubt on their respondents’ ability to 
make choices, turning to addiction to do so. When one of Carl’s clients applies for an 
intervention order, the presiding magistrate typically begins by setting the application to 
one side, encouraging the lawyers representing both parties to first try and negotiate an 
amicable solution. Four main possibilities are available here: the parties reach an 
agreement for a comprehensive intervention order, they reach agreement for a limited 
order, they fail to reach an agreement, or the victim withdraws the application. If an 
agreement is reached, the parties go back before the magistrate, set out the terms of the 
agreement and ask the magistrate to approve it, thus giving it effect as a court order. If 
no agreement can be reached, the matter then goes to a contested hearing, either on the 
same day or on a later day.49 One of the main incentives for reaching an agreement is that 
it negates the need to go back before the magistrate and risk an unfavourable decision. In 
other words, both parties have pragmatic reasons for accepting alleged facts and finding 
a way to resolve the dispute without the participation of the magistrate. Naturally, 
lawyers understand the tensions and incentives at play as these strategic informal 
discussions unfold. 
 
                                                        
49 For more detail on how these processes unfold, see, for example: https://www.legalaid.vic.gov.au/find-
legal-answers/family-violence-intervention-orders/going-to-court/what-can-happen-hearing (accessed 9th 
September 2015). For more on rates of resolution and contest, see, for example: Victorian Department of 
Justice (2009); Wearing (1996). 
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In Carl’s view, lawyers’ uses of addiction in these negotiations often reproduce 
very ‘gendered approaches and gendered responses’ to family violence. In one part of the 
interview he explained that lawyers often make claims that addicts lack agency: 
 
Yeah, so we have a scenario where we might be looking after Mum. Dad’s been 
removed from the home by virtue of an intervention order. The lawyer comes up 
and is trying to argue […] that ‘actually he’s got an alcohol addiction, he’s an 
alcoholic and he recognises that and as an alcoholic he has limited control over 
his aggression because of the nature of his addiction. And as a resolution type 
thing, he has undertaken to get drug and alcohol counselling to address that and 
on that basis, we [propose that you] withdraw the intervention order or make it a 
limited order so that he can come back home’. So immediately the cause of the 
family violence is not actually about him choosing to beat up his wife, it’s actually 
this insidious alcohol addiction that’s controlling his behaviour and causing him 
to beat up his wife.  
 
Carl goes on to offer his assessment of this strategy and its logic: 
 
Now in a family violence context, you know [this] is an absolute misnomer on so 
many different levels because, for example, if he goes to the pub and gets pissed 
there because he’s an alcoholic, the chances are he doesn’t turn around and 
punch the crap out of everybody that’s in his immediate vicinity. He doesn’t walk 
down the street and beat up anyone that looks at him funny. He actually goes 
home with a belly full of grog and then lashes out against his partner. […It] only 
seems to happen when he’s in the home, against his wife.  
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Here Carl’s scepticism about the way addiction is ‘bandied about’ by lawyers, 
extends not just to the way key concepts of the ‘disease’ (such as agency) are 
conceptualised, but to lawyers’ selective approaches to them. Despite his scepticism, 
however, he must engage in a process of ‘unpicking … those excuses’ through 
negotiations with other lawyers. These negotiations task them with evaluating the 
veracity of the evidence, if any, of addiction, along with what Carl considers ‘very 
complex’ scientific debates about its nature and effects. In many instances these 
assessments are made by duty lawyers, whose primary role is to assist unrepresented 
litigants in court, and whose training is, like that of most other lawyers and magistrates, 
purely legal. In a Latourian sense, these lawyers appear to be playing a key role in 
establishing and settling ‘facts’, including medico-legal and scientific ‘facts’ about the 
nature and effects of addiction.  
 
Where an agreement is reached (or, in Latourian terms, particular ‘truths’ are 
established), as Carl explained, lawyers go back before the Court, outlining the nature of 
any agreement reached (with respect to an order) along with the reasons for it. According 
to Carl, how this information is received will depend heavily on the individual magistrate: 
 
Different magistrates have actually talked about getting some anger management, 
getting drug and alcohol counselling in a family violence context. And on the one 
hand when you’ve got a ‘Do not drink clause’ included [as part of the order], you 
actually are almost signing up to that understanding that it’s actually alcohol that’s 
the problem, not the family violence. But then the flipside is that if the parties 
have reached agreement on that, then the magistrates are usually reluctant to 
interfere with that, particularly if there’s legal advice all round and it’s providing 
that measure of safety [for the victim].  
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As with our earlier example of the Insite case, Carl’s example suggests that officials of all 
kinds take part in processes of legal veridiction pertaining to addiction. Courts appear to 
hand over power to legal officials trained only to know what is required in order for legal 
tests to be satisfied, leaving it to them to establish the ‘truth’ or ‘falsity’ of a claim. 
Significantly, judges may have very limited involvement in the process of evaluating 
medical evidence and/or the veracity of claims made about the nature of addiction and 
key addiction concepts. While these claims are sometimes tested in court (in contested 
proceedings), much is not. This means that the lion’s share of work done to stabilise 
addiction – to define it, decide what it causes and how it can be addressed – is 
undertaken by other players hidden from public scrutiny, and with potentially major 
implications for those affected.  
 
Although Carl’s view is that lawyers deploy (and ultimately often constitute) 
‘addiction’ in their work in part for strategic reasons, others we interviewed were more 
sceptical. Alexandra, a Canadian lawyer, believed that lawyers’ approaches to addiction 
were shaped by a combination of factors, including naivety about their clients’ lives, a 
lack of knowledge about drug use and addiction, and moralising about their clients’ 
behaviour. Lawyers often made assumptions and judgments about their clients and the 
nature of their ‘problems’. Speaking about illicit drug use and ‘addiction’, Alexandra 
explained:  
 
I think there is a tremendous class divide between people who use drugs – at 
least in my neighbourhood – and most lawyers, so if they know anything about 
addiction it’s a drinking aunt or a classmate who does lots of coke. And it’s not 
this unknowing and this space between these two groups isn’t restricted to ideas 
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about drug use, but it’s caught up in almost Victorian morality about how you 
conduct your life and what is proper conduct. And I think that’s part of the 
problem and that’s part of the harm that lawyers do when they bring ideas from a 
different place and a different class and pose them in a place where they don’t 
belong. And there’s too much lawyers talking to clients and not enough lawyers 
listening to clients and saying, ‘Yeah okay, so you’re using this much, what does 
that mean for you, what impact does that actually have on your life?’, instead of 
thinking, ‘Oh how could you possibly use?’ I think the same kind of shame that 
middle class people see around a pregnant women having a glass of wine in a 
restaurant, it gets amplified by lawyers and imposed on clients. 
 
Alexandra’s account raise questions about the making of drug ‘problems’ and addiction 
realities as well as the reasons why drug use and ‘addiction’ concepts are deployed in legal 
contexts and stabilised in the particular ways they are. In signalling a gender dimension to 
lawyers’ thinking and practices (via the symbolic figure of the pregnant woman), 
Alexandra also touches upon the potentially gendered nature and effects of lawyers’ 
practices: a subject to which we shall shortly return.  
 
Returning to Carl’s account, and the broader literature describing the court 
processes to which he refers, we see four important questions raised. First, are judges, 
widely thought to be our central legal decision-making figures, involved in the decisions 
the public believes they are? Second, do the court officials who are making decisions have 
any expertise in, or knowledge of, addiction? Third, is there sufficient independent 
oversight – even from judges – of the dialogue that unfolds privately between lawyers so 
crucial to the stabilisation of addiction ‘facts’ and to the fortunes of victims and 
respondents? Given much of this decision-making is not open to scrutiny, what do we 
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know of its equity? In particular, how does it withstand scrutiny from the point of view 
of gender? Although these processes are not inherently gendered and indeed may affect 
anyone who is understood in a legal setting to be experiencing an addiction, they do have 
particular implications for women in that it is widely accepted that women experience 
family and sexual violence at disproportionate rates to men.50 Wherever addiction is used 
to excuse or mitigate against this violence, women are necessarily disproportionately 
affected as victims. In this sense, legal conceptualisations of health and illness, and the 
veridiction processes that allow these conceptualisations to take form as legal ‘facts,’ help 
shape the way traditionally gendered forms of violence come to be understood, 
potentially entrenching assumptions about, and material effects of male violence, agency, 
the male and female body and gender, along the way.  
 
While these gendered effects could be considered inadvertent, other ways 
addiction concepts are said to play out in such proceedings suggest that gendered 
assumptions shape rather more directly than this the arguments made. Carl also spoke of 
ways key issues of addiction (agency, responsibility and volition) were inverted – with 
perverse results – where the female victim of violence was the claimed ‘addict’. While 
alcoholism, for example, may serve as a useful defence for male perpetrators of violence, 
 
‘female alcoholic’ will often be used against her by an abusive partner.  You know: 
‘She’s an alcoholic, she’s always drinking, you know she lashes out at me so I lash 
back’. And in that instance […] she’s turned into the perpetrator or she’s actually 
causing the trouble within the relationship. So then [the Court will] question 
                                                        
50 Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs. (2011). (Accessed at: 
https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/women/programs-services/reducing-violence/the-national-
plan-to-reduce-violence-against-women-and-their-children-2010-2022, 1st September 2015).  
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mark whether or not she’s a fit parent or whether she needs an intervention 
order to protect her because she’s the one getting pissed and lashing out. 
 
According to Carl, such portrayals may even occur where the female partner is 
acknowledged to consume alcohol or other drugs as a response to trauma experienced as 
a result of her partner’s violence: 
 
…Research will point to that as her coping mechanism. So her living in a violent 
relationship and her coping strategy is to drink or take drugs, or whatever. So 
now suddenly she’s a ‘junkie’, ‘alco’ mother who is unsafe for the kids to stay 
with, whereas Dad, who’s actually been committing horrendous violence, is an 
upstanding sober sort of person. The court will more often than not put the kids 
with Dad at least on an interim basis, which then feeds into the trauma of Mum, 
which can escalate her drinking or substance abuse. 
 
As with the previous examples, these very serious, complex issues are often first debated 
outside the formal court setting. Significant, even definitive, aspects of the case are 
frequently agreed upon there, including those involving key concepts of addiction. 
According to the accounts given by the participants in our study, then, it appears that 
lawyers and the processes in which they are engaged play a vital ‘veridicting’ role in 
relation to drug use and addiction, and in the process to related concepts such as agency, 
responsibility and culpability.  
 
Also concerned about these issues was another lawyer in our study, Erin, whose 
work was in Australian women’s rights, primarily in the areas of family law and family 
violence. According to Erin, these processes (and in our terms, the modes of legal 
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veridiction they entail) posed major ‘ethical’ dilemmas for lawyers, especially where 
alcohol and other drug consumption or addiction was being asserted and directly tied to 
questions of witness credibility, agency and legal responsibility or moral culpability for 
gendered violence. As she explained: 
 
It’s almost like the thing we talk about with sexual assault, that sort of blaming 
victim thing, comes in to play. And so, being a women’s lawyer, I don’t want to 
encourage that, but then also the client is determined they don’t want the 
intervention order because they were drug or alcohol affected also.  That is 
difficult and I don’t know what the answer is to that.   
 
Other lawyers we interviewed raised related concerns, especially where the implication of 
that is that violent conduct is compulsive. For example, Australian lawyer Melanie feared 
that existing legal processes could have far reaching implications for forms of sexual 
violence that traditionally impact on women more than men: 
 
I do find it quite perplexing, just the notion of being enslaved to behaviours […] 
because for a compulsive paedophile, they are enslaved to those behaviours, 
that’s a sexual preference that’s grown up from, usually, adolescence. And I 
wonder, it’s funny, just the judgment calls that we put on particular behaviours 
and ‘this is controllable’ and ‘this is deplorable’ and ‘this is repugnant’, whereas 
‘this is an addiction’. And I wonder whether that’s – I’m just thinking out loud 
really – but I just wonder whether that’s been looked at. 
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Melanie’s question is well-founded. In our view, more research is needed to establish 
how common are the processes of veridiction she describes, and in what settings, and 
with what effects.  
 
Speaking in a very different context – the rights of sex workers – Canadian 
lawyer Erica also raised concerns about the use of addiction in legal processes, in 
particular, the use of claims that addiction is a disease to justify coercive and paternalistic 
policies, or to deny the rights of women. She argues that since the Insite decision, 
conceptualisations of addiction as a disease have been combined in Canadian legal 
settings with questions about sex workers’ agency to launch renewed criticism of the 
practice and a push to ban it:  
 
…the idea is that the illness of addiction removes your actual ability to make 
choice. The same idea is imposed on sex workers not just because of the fact that 
many are addicted in the group of people that I work with, but just by [virtue of] 
the idea that nobody could possibly choose doing this work.  
 
Here, prevailing understandings of drug use, addiction and sex work appear to converge 
to shape gender and agency in ways that pose significant issues for women’s rights. We 
know very little about how these processes of veridiction unfold, nor how they might 
differ across jurisdictions, different legal settings and different areas of law.  As in our 
previous examples, given the significant stakes here, more research is needed on how 




This article has aimed to illuminate the role of legal processes of veridiction in defining 
and responding to addiction, and to consider the effects of these processes. Drawing on 
the perceptions of lawyers interviewed for a study of addiction in the law in Australia and 
Canada, it has explored the ways lawyers understand their own role in legal processes 
that enact addiction as a disease, and the gendered implications of these enactments.  
Using Bruno Latour’s work on modes of veridiction, we analysed our interview accounts, 
arguing that lawyers appear to play a very central role in stabilising addiction ‘facts’ and 
establishing legal ‘truths’ about addiction. These legal ‘truths’ may differ in key ways from 
scientific truths about addiction given legal requirements for establishing facts differ 
significantly from scientific requirements for establishing facts. Building on these 
observations and drawing further on interview accounts we explored the gender 
implications of these processes, observing that legal practices of veridiction risk securing, 
reinforcing and perpetuating gendered inequalities for women. Specifically, the particular 
ways the law establishes truth (its processes of veridiction) allow non-expert deliberations 
that can reproduce existing inequitable relations between men and women. These 
deliberations are by their nature largely hidden from scrutiny. According to our 
participant accounts, lawyers are just as instrumental as judges in defining addiction and 
shaping gender. Yet their work is less well known and less invigilated. In neglecting this 
apparently key role for lawyers, important opportunities for reform of legal practices and 
processes might be being missed. This is an important issue in need of attention.   
 
In closing, we do not discount the diversity of effects these legal processes 
produce; including the beneficial implications they have for individuals labelled ‘addicts’. 
This is a process we have analysed at length elsewhere.51 Yet it is essential to 
acknowledge the potentially adverse implications such processes can have, and the 
                                                        
51 See Seear and Fraser (2014b).  
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disproportionate risks they pose for women. In sum, we identify three key ways legal 
processes that stabilise addiction as disease can impact disproportionately upon women 
(and there may be more). Where lawyers agree that addiction is a ‘disease’: 
 
1. respondents can be said to lack agency and/or to have diminished 
responsibility or culpability for violence they commit, including family 
violence and sexual violence against women; 
2. victims can be said to exercise agency and/or increased responsibility or 
culpability for the acts of violence committed against them, including family 
violence; 
3. victims lack agency and are unable to make rational decisions in their own 
best interests, justifying potentially paternalistic policies concerning the rights 
of women to make decisions about their own bodies.  
 
In all these respects mobilisations of addiction as disease promise to disadvantage 
women. In identifying these tendencies in the interview data we collected, we have drawn 
attention to the central role of legal processes of veridiction in them, noting that legal 
ways of establishing truth often proceed in the absence of expertise on central issues, and 
do so in ways that render them inaccessible to scrutiny. As we have noted, this article 
draws primarily upon accounts from lawyers about their roles in addiction veridiction, 
and their perceptions of events and motivations. We recognise that these processes 
might be more complex and nuanced than perceived by our participants. However, the 
broad structures on which these accounts are based; the legal requirements for alternative 
forms of dispute resolution, the role of lawyers in deliberations, and their lack of 
visibility, are well established, as are central empirical matters such as the 
disproportionately gendered incidence of family violence. Together, these accounts and 
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the broader circumstances in which they are said to have occurred warrant further 
research. We would like to see more work, particularly in the form of direct observation 
of legal processes, if access to them can indeed be secured, along with an exploration of 
lawyers’ strategic decision making processes and motivations in the construction and 
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